Cooperation between China and the United States, the world’s two largest emitters of carbon dioxide, to limit emissions and pursue alternative energy paths has become a major global political challenge. NGOs, academic organizations, and policy think-tanks are involved in breaking through current barriers to cooperation.

Cooperation between the United States and China to reduce climate change (or global warming) is widely seen as one of the most pressing issues for the worldwide community. China’s energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions could grow more than fourfold in the next twenty years, thus catching up with and overtaking large industrialized nations (with the exception of the United States and Canada) in per capita emissions. Or, China could implement advanced energy technologies and policies to cut energy-demand growth, in which case its carbon dioxide emissions might only double. The first case would impact the global environment very seriously; the second case is more tolerable. If the latter is accompanied by significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries and the aggressive development of low-carbon energy technology, the world could be on the way to cutting emissions significantly by 2050.

Strategic mistrust between China and the United States, however, has interfered with a binding global agreement on energy caps. The Chinese believe that a commitment to reducing carbon dioxide emissions could stifle their development; the U.S. speculates that, because of its large trade deficit with China, any adoption of a carbon dioxide cap without a comparable commitment by China could drive the two nations’ trade balance out of control.

A solution to the problem of greenhouse gas emissions depends critically on both countries. China and the United States account for nearly 40 percent of current global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions; they also have the greatest potential to reduce emissions growth. The participation of both nations is essential in the effort to establish a global regime to contain these emissions.

Background History

Fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—provide most of the world’s commercial energy. When they are burned, carbon dioxide is released; it and other greenhouse gases keep solar radiation (or heat) trapped on Earth. This is known as the “greenhouse effect.” According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the mean global temperature increased approximately 0.6^oC from 1890 to 1990, and they predict a 1.1ºC–6.4ºC rise during the twenty-first century. This increase in surface temperatures on Earth can have catastrophic results, affecting weather, global water levels, and plant and animal life, among other issues. Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions make up approximately 80 percent of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, so their containment is a global issue.

While there is disagreement about solutions to climate change, there are some facts that are generally accepted regarding the historical, current, and anticipated future situation of China and the United States and greenhouse gas emissions.

The first mutually accepted fact is that the United States is responsible for 28 percent of total cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide from energy consumption, while China is responsible for 8.5 percent. Because of carbon dioxide’s long “residence time” in the atmosphere (more than 100 years), the contributions from many years ago affect the global greenhouse as much as today’s emissions. Therefore, the most important measure of energy-use contributions to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is the cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide.

A country’s energy use conventionally is presented in terms of per capita emissions, in the same way that gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, not GDP alone, is a measure of the economic well-being of a country. (GDP is the total market value of all of a country’s goods and services produced in a given year minus the net income earned abroad.)

In describing contributions of a country, it is useful to present this in terms of per capita emissions, in the same way that GDP/capita, not GDP, is a measure of the economic well-being of a country. That is, over the entire period during which we can estimate carbon emissions due to human activity (roughly since 1850), China’s cumulative per capita emissions of energy-related CO₂ are less than 8 percent of those of the United States.

This is generally seen as a remarkable achievement, as virtually all countries undergoing very rapid economic development—China had 9–10 percent annual GDP growth over those two decades—experience energy growth that is faster than GDP growth. China’s reduction in energy demand growth was the consequence of explicit policies carried out domestically. If energy had grown just at the rate of GDP, China’s emissions of CO₂ would be more than twice as great as today’s emissions.

Notwithstanding these reductions in growth of CO₂ emissions, U.S. CO₂ emissions per capita are 2.5 times greater than those of the European Union countries and 2.1 times those of Japan. The European Union and Japan are not far behind the United States in GDP/capita. But these nations have much less land per capita and have much higher population densities. High population density reduces travel demand and results in smaller per capita emissions.

For industrialized countries, emissions are likely to decline over time in proportion to GDP growth because many activities and products have saturated their markets: For example, not many people are purchasing their first car, and virtually all homes have refrigerators and most are not seeking to have a second. This is confirmed by the fact that from 1975 to the present, the United States reduced the growth of its energy-related carbon dioxide emissions more than any other large industrialized country in the world. GDP per capita grew almost 200 percent while energy consumption (and carbon dioxide emissions) per capita remained constant. But it is useful to use a baseline that has carbon dioxide emissions growing at the rate of growth of GDP when making comparisons among countries.

China and the United States currently produce approximately equal levels of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions and together are responsible for almost half of such emissions worldwide. According to the International Energy Agency’s 2008 World Energy Outlook, China is projected to account for more than 40 percent of new energy-related carbon dioxide emissions globally between 2008 and 2030, thus being by far the largest future contributor to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. But in 2006, China instituted a national program to reduce energy intensity 20 percent by 2010; it is noteworthy that in 2006 the energy intensity (energy demand per unit of GDP) decreased by 1.3 percent (that is, energy grew 1.3 percent less rapidly than GDP) and by 3.7 percent in 2007, with greater intensity declines projected for 2008. The program started slowly but is now approaching its annual target.

The United States, meanwhile, has the greatest potential of any country in the world to reduce energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. This is true for two reasons: First, because the U.S. per capita intensity of these emissions is considerably higher than those of other large industrial countries (2.5 times that of the European Union and 2.1 times that of Japan), there is greater opportunity to decrease the numbers; and second, the United States has the scientific, technical, and economic capability of developing viable alternatives to fossil-energy technologies and is likely to be the world leader in any breakthrough technology, if one is developed. Annual growth of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in the United States in the coming decades is expected to be in the range of 0.5–1.0 percent unless new policies are enacted to cut carbon dioxide emissions.

For the future, neither China nor the United States have agreed to binding commitments on greenhouse gas emissions. In 1992 the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) established an intergovernmental plan to reduce and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions; the resulting agreement is named the Kyoto Protocol. China is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, but it actually contains no binding commitment for developing countries. Recognizing that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden on industrialized nations. As of 2008, the United States had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.

In describing contributions of a country, it is useful to present this in terms of per capita emissions, in the same way that GDP/capita, not GDP, is a measure of the economic well-being of a country. That is, over the entire period during which we can estimate carbon emissions due to human activity (roughly since 1850), China’s cumulative per capita emissions of energy-related CO₂ are less than 8 percent of those of the United States.

This is generally seen as a remarkable achievement, as virtually all countries undergoing very rapid economic development—China had 9–10 percent annual GDP growth over those two decades—experience energy growth that is faster than GDP growth. China’s reduction in energy demand growth was the consequence of explicit policies carried out in China. If energy had grown just at the rate of GDP, China’s emissions of CO₂ would be more than twice as great as today’s emissions.

Notwithstanding these reductions in growth of CO₂ emissions, U.S. CO₂ emissions per capita are 2.5 times greater than those of the European Union countries and 2.1 times those of Japan. The European Union and Japan are not far behind the United States in GDP/capita.  However, these nations have much less land per capita and have much higher population densities. High population density reduces travel demand and results in smaller per capita emissions.

Two Viewpoints

It is generally not understood in the West that China has put tremendous effort into reducing the growth of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions through the design and implementation of aggressive and innovative energy efficiency policies. Instead, there is a perception that China has paid little attention to the matter of greenhouse gas emissions. From 2001 to 2006, China’s energy demand and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions grew faster than the 10 percent annual growth of GDP. This led to an increase in China’s emissions from 12.7 percent of global emissions (2001) to 18.4 percent (2006). Many in the United States look at these facts, noting how rapidly China has grown in the past five years, and are aware of the forecasts that predict that a large proportion of the world’s expected increase in energy-related carbon dioxide emissions this century will come from China. Many Americans express concern that emissions reductions applied to the United States could increase the cost of producing goods and services there, thus placing the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage with any country that does not do the same.

But the perspective from China is very different. The Chinese note that per capita energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions are much lower in China than in the United States. They emphasize the disproportionate cumulative contribution of the United States to the global greenhouse gas problem, pointing out that the United States, with a population one-quarter the size of China’s, is responsible for putting far more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than has China. This point is made to indicate the inequity inherent in focusing on current emissions while a large part of the problem is caused by emissions over long periods of time.

These views may provide a philosophical underpinning that supports China’s major concern looking forward: China believes that it will need more energy for development—much more. Chinese officials observe that the industrialized countries have already been through the energy-intensive phase of their development, but China is in the midst of its own. The possibility of gaining a competitive trade advantage through a new climate treaty is much less significant to the Chinese than the possible roadblocks to achieving social development goals that could result from a commitment to mandatory emissions targets.

Efforts Towards Cooperation

It is not enough that China and the United States both take steps to reduce carbon dioxide emissions; it is essential that the two countries do this cooperatively. As long as China does little to reduce growth of greenhouse gas emissions (or appears to be doing little), it will be politically difficult for the United States to sign a binding international treaty that commits to a serious cap on emissions. And as long as the United States either does little or appears to be doing little, it is impossible to imagine China committing to any international treaty that limits its own emissions.

At a 2008 hearing held by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, representatives from the China Energy Group proposed that the United States and China should engage in regular, formal discussions that focus on working together to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with the goal of influencing global negotiations. A serious proposal agreed to by both the United States and China is likely to be acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries.

A research group that has worked with energy policy-makers in China for two decades to analyze, develop, and enhance Chinese energy policy, the China Energy Group further recommended that in the short term, the greatest support the United States can provide to China (and other developing countries) is to build capacity in those countries to create and implement policies and programs that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Western resources can provide training and technical assistance to Chinese enterprises that will in turn establish new energy standards and compliance regulations. The assistance develops the potential for the Chinese to pursue energy efficiency, but does not pay for it. Such a program also will need to engage the full participation of the international community: It should include all industrialized countries as donors and key developing countries as recipients. This is not an investment program; it is focused on building capabilities to design and implement policies, many of which will facilitate investments with funds coming from other sources.

In the long term, the solution to climate change will have to rely on technology that is not yet commercialized. New low-carbon technologies are essential to reduce energy-related carbon dioxide emissions to appropriate levels. For the most part, such technology is not available today, and the intellectual property for these technologies does not exist yet. There is a need for programs to support joint development of such technologies, using the technical and financial resources of many countries. The United States government could play a key role in establishing a basis for performing research and development on these technologies with other nations (including China) and the sharing of intellectual property of these future technologies among nations of the world.

The China Energy Group also proposed that the leaders of the high-level teams from both countries should be policy makers above the level of the climate-change negotiators. These discussions should not be construed as bilateral negotiating sessions; the goal is for China and the United States to reach a consensus that can serve as a model for the European Union and developing nations. Any agreement must include binding commitments that will not threaten China’s growth and internal development goals, and that will give China access to the knowledge, tools, and technology that lower the cost of reducing emissions; for the United States, it is crucial that implementation of the agreement will not exacerbate the U.S. trade deficit with China. A formula that might work in China is a commitment that industrial emissions would grow slower than the industrial value added over the next decade, for example, 80 percent as fast, after which time a new formula could be agreed upon. The advantage of this approach is that it places no constraint on the consumer economy, which China views as necessary to meet its social and economic development objectives. A further advantage is that this approach addresses the industrial sector, which is responsible for 70 percent of all energy-related emissions; it thus speaks to the activities in China that are by far the largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions.

There are other formulas that could be used for China as well. Most involve the adoption of an emissions target that increases as GDP increases, thus assuring China that growth would not be impacted as long as proper measures are taken to reduce the growth of greenhouse gases. Like the industrial emissions approach, the formula could involve a commitment that greenhouse gas emissions grow at a rate lower than that of GDP with the provision of technical support, capacity building, and/or funds to facilitate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Achieving better results could trigger greater levels of assistance.

Trade Policies

Trade remains a major divisive topic, but there are different ways to deal with this issue. One, for example, is based on the concept of “carbon credits,” a tool formalized in the Kyoto Protocol and monitored by the UNFCC that expects to reduce greenhouse gases by having countries honor their emissions quotas and offers monetary incentives for being below those targets. (This system has been adopted by the European Union, and it has resulted carbon credits of about $20 or $30 per metric ton.) To avoid impact on trade in the case where limits on Chinese emissions in early years would produce only small increases in the price of its products for export, China would agree to a tax on exports equal to the cost of a carbon credit (in dollars per metric ton). To avoid this being too cumbersome, it would apply only to products that are energy- (and therefore carbon-) intensive in their manufacture. Under this proposal, China would collect the tax and be required to apply it to its program of reducing carbon dioxide emissions. A program such as this would eliminate the trade advantage that China might gain by having less rigid commitments than industrial countries. It would have the further benefit of assuring that resources in China would be used to address greenhouse gas emissions.

An international commission would be needed to oversee the uses of the tax in China (and presumably other developing countries, if the approach is extended to them) as well as the provision of resources from the United States and other industrialized countries to support greenhouse gas abatement in developing countries.

Protecting Economic Growth

In the United States, economic growth and energy use over a period of a decade or longer are relatively predictable. Absent a multiyear recession, annual economic growth over a period of a decade or more is likely to be 1.5–3 percent. Growth in annual energy demand and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions, without new policies, is likely to be in the range of 0.5–1.0 percent. (With a long-term recession, the growth of energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions will be at a decreased rate, thus lowering the difference between targets and emissions in a base case.)

Forecasts in this range apply to most industrialized countries, for which many consumer products such as refrigerators and cars have already approached saturation. In short, it is possible to understand at a general level what is entailed in achieving certain targets for greenhouse gas emissions over a period of one to two decades.

But for a rapidly developing country such as China, growth in energy demand and resulting carbon dioxide emissions can have much greater variations. The Chinese economy grew at annual rate of 9–10 percent from 1980 to 2000; during this period energy demand grew at an annual rate of 4–5 percent. (In only one year during this period did the increase in energy demand growth exceed even 60 percent of that of GDP.) But from 2001 to 2006 GDP in China continued its growth at 10 percent per year (or greater). One might have predicted that energy demand in China would have grown at a rate lower than 5 percent per year, as it had done over the previous twenty years; indeed, forecasters did predict this. But energy demand grew even faster than GDP during the period, averaging almost 12 percent per year.

Consequently, it is extremely difficult in China, in its present stage of economic development, to predict with any accuracy the energy-demand growth over a ten- to twenty-year period. This is one reason that China cannot accept a binding cap that is expressed in absolute terms, unless such a cap were well in excess of the higher range of expected emissions. (But if a cap were set so high, it would be meaningless.)

China and other developing countries will have the largest emissions in the future, and there is great concern worldwide that China will continue increasing its energy demand and spewing carbon dioxide into the environment forever, or at least for a very long time. But China is in the middle stage of building its infrastructure—housing, commercial buildings, roads, hospitals, schools, and the like. It is at a relatively early stage of increasing the mobility of its population, and large quantities of energy are required to accomplish these tasks. This period is likely to last for fifteen to twenty-five years, depending on whether China continues its breakneck speed of construction and whether large numbers of rural dwellers continue migrating into urban areas. At the end of this construction period, China’s economy will be much like today’s developed countries. Energy-demand growth will decline markedly, just as it now has in the industrialized world. Scarcity of traditional energy sources could slow energy-demand growth even further in this time.

Outlook for the Twenty-First Century

The key question about the future concerns what China’s energy demand will be when its economy becomes mature, or when infrastructure is built out and most amenities have been met. If China has a structure of consumption similar to that of the United States today, and the construction techniques and industrial processes are inefficient in their use of energy and other resources, then not only China but the world will be in serious trouble. But from 1980 to 2000, China has shown its willingness to grow its economy while constraining energy growth to less than half that of economic growth. Today China exhibits a serious willingness to once again limit energy growth, and significant support from industrialized countries can help greatly in achieving this objective. If at the same time the industrialized countries learn to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—and transfer this knowledge to China and other developing countries—then a sincere start at addressing the serious challenge of climate change will be possible. This approach can buy time while energy supply technologies that produce low carbon emissions are developed and deployed on a large scale.

Mark D. LEVINE

Further Reading

Asia Society. (2009). Common challenge, collaborative response: A roadmap for US-China cooperation on energy and climate change. An Asia Society Task Force Report January 2009. Retrieved February 20, 2009 from http://www.asiasociety.org/taskforces/climateroadmap/

Energy Information Administration. (n.d.). Retrieved on January 23, 2009, from http://www.eia.doe.gov/

Levine, M. D. (2008, August 13). Testimony presented at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing “China’s Energy Policies and their Environmental Impacts.” Retrieved on January 23, 2009, from http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/written_testimonies/08_08_13_wrts/08_08_13_levine_statement.pdf

United Nations Framework on Climate Change. (n.d.). Kyoto Protocol. Retrieved on January 23, 2009, from http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php

China currently emits more CO₂ into the world’s atmosphere than any other country (but not more per capita). It faces international pressure to control these emissions because they are a primary cause of climate change, but China claims it should not be held responsible for CO₂ “export emissions” that can be attributed to the production of items for export to the United States and other nations.

It is an accepted fact that China’s exports are responsible for large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions; in 2005, carbon dioxide emissions from China were estimated at 1700 Mt (million metric tons, compared to around 30,000 Mt emitted by humans due to fossil fuels each year), or 6 percent of global emissions from fossil fuels, which is unusually high, as US exports are about 500 Mt. Reacting to international demands to reduce greenhouse gases, China has claimed that limits on carbon dioxide emissions would hamper both economic development and its efforts to relieve poverty. It has also emphasized that per capita emissions ranked only seventy-third in 2004, but this ranking is higher than some developed countries, and it is growing rapidly. China also argues that its historical, cumulative contribution to carbon emissions is low, and while this is true on a per capita basis (China ranked ninety-second in cumulative emissions from 1900 to 2004), it is fourth in cumulative emissions since 1990. A final argument against mandated emissions limits is related to the role of exports (that is, products made in China for sale elsewhere): China claims that it should not be held responsible for emissions that can be attributed to the production of items for export to the United States and other nations.

Gauging the contribution of exports to China’s carbon dioxide emissions is not easy, but they have clearly risen dramatically over the past decade. A 1997 study by the ecologists Ahmad and Wyckoff found that 15 percent of China’s emissions were “embodied” in products to be exported to other countries (that is, they were the byproduct of the manufacturing of toys, electronics, shoes, and other exports, while only 3 percent of China’s domestic emissions were imported. By 2001, further studies found that the figures had increased to 24 percent and 7 percent respectively, showing that a larger volume of goods was being traded. But the export amount is still much higher than that of imports, as one would expect from the current balance of trade between China and, for example, the United States.

Export Growth

In 1987, 12 percent (230 Mt) of China’s domestic carbon dioxide emissions were created during the production of exports; by 2005, this figure steadily had risen to 33 percent (1700 Mt). These numbers closely mirror the rise of exports as a percentage of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), which suggests that export products are no more or no less carbon-intensive than products for domestic consumption.

Of China’s 1700 Mt of export emissions in 2005 (which was comparable to the 1850 Mt total emissions of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), 22 percent came from exports of electronic goods, 13 percent from metal products, 11 percent from textiles, and 10 percent from chemical products. The recent surge in export emissions can be attributed to value-added products, which is evident when compared to previous years. In 1995, for example, the breakdown was very different: 19 percent textiles, 13 percent electronics, 12 percent machinery, 10 percent chemicals, and 7 percent metal products. Emissions embodied in primary product exports—such as minerals, raw timber, raw chemicals, and basic metals—decreased from 20 to 24 percent during the years from 1987 to 1992 to only 13 percent during the years from 2002 to 2005, showing how the Chinese economy has evolved into producing higher value-added items, such as electronics, which are more valuable as a product than their parts combined.

International attention to China’s role in causing—and mitigating—climate change shows how important trade is in the environmental profile of many countries. In general, small countries have larger shares of domestic emissions from the production of exports (for example, most European countries have a 20 to 50 percent share) while relatively self-sufficient countries have lower shares (such as the United States with 8 percent, Japan with 15 percent, India at 13 percent, and South Korea, 28 percent). China does not fit into this categorization because it is a large country with a large share of exports contributing greenhouse gases; its exports therefore play a more important role in its environmental profile.

Environmental Implications

Experts question whether the rapid growth of exports in China (or any other country) comes at the loss of production in developed countries, a phenomenon termed “carbon leakage” or the “pollution haven hypothesis.” The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the international group that represents the consensus on climate change science, has not rated carbon leakage as very important, because its definition of leakage only considers marginal emission changes in nonindustrialized countries that have been caused by climate policy in industrialized countries. It remains unlikely, however, that this is the case in China, where the increase of emissions is most likely a byproduct of China’s other advantages for production—in particular, lower environmental standards and lower labor costs.

A large proportion of goods responsible for China’s export emissions go to the developed world: approximately 27 percent to the United States, 19 percent to the twenty-seven European Union countries, and 14 percent to the other remaining Annex B countries, mainly Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. (Annex B countries are those industrialized nations that have agreed to emissions caps according to the Kyoto Protocol, a binding intergovernmental agreement signed in 1992.) While approximately 40 percent of China’s export emissions go to other developing nations, flows to these countries may displace their own domestic production or production from another trading partner that might have produced goods with less energy intensity than China. (Energy intensity is defined as the energy required per unit of economic output, or energy demand per unit of GDP.) This may be significant because production is more polluting in China than in many other countries due to inefficient systems and a coal-dominated electricity supply. The apparent low cost of Chinese production comes with other consequences: damage to the Chinese environment and increased energy emissions that contribute to the international risk from global warming. Some energy experts point out that if the Chinese could decrease the cost of the production of environmentally friendly items such as energy-efficient lighting or wind turbines, the effect of emissions would be outweighed by the beneficial impacts of their use.

Potential Solutions

A possible approach to solving the problem of a huge amount of export emissions would be to use monetary or tax policies to discourage large-volume export commodities such as electronics, machinery, metal products, and textiles. But these higher value-added products contribute to China’s economic growth more than primary products like natural resources, so in a time of economic challenge, this could lead to a loss in competitiveness and higher costs to consuming countries through inflation. Over the long term, it is in the interest of both the West and China to lower the energy and carbon intensity of its production practices, and to cooperate on low-carbon research and development.

While China benefits from export growth in terms of its GDP and balance of trade, consumers in developed countries also benefit. For this reason, there are efforts to hold consumers in developed countries at least partially accountable for emissions occurring because of the demand for low-priced goods. If consumers were to take some responsibility for China’s export emissions, it is conceivable that China would be more willing to play an active role in post-Kyoto climate commitments. And if China does not want to be held wholly responsible for its export emissions (as it claims), then it must at least be held responsible for what it imports. This could become important in the future, as China shifts to more of a consumption-driven economy.

Although one-third of China’s carbon dioxide emissions result from the production of exports, the remaining two-thirds need to be addressed as well. Inefficient, coal-dominated electricity production is the major cause of China’s carbon dioxide emissions, accounting for 44 percent in 2005. Urgent improvements are needed in this sector. Increasing efficiency in manufacturing as well as domestic and commercial building and in transportation is essential. Other solutions are expanding renewable energy generation and investing in new technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), which seeks to develop ways to capture, purify, and store carbon dioxide instead of releasing it and contributing to climate change. Allowing parties to the Kyoto Protocol to shoulder some of the incremental cost of CCS as part of their commitment to decrease greenhouse gas emissions would be a first step, as this would allow importers of China’s carbon-intensive, emissions-producing goods to invest in lowering the carbon intensity of what they buy.

Christopher WEBER

Further Reading

Ahmad, N., & Wyckoff, A. A. (2003). Carbon dioxide emissions embodied in international trade of goods. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Retrieved February 13, 209, from http://masetto.sourceoecd.org/vl=3507516/cl=16/nw=1/rpsv/cgi-bin/wppdf?file=5lgsjhvj7ld6.pdf

International Energy Agency. (2007). World Energy Outlook 2007. Paris: Author.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (1996). Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (Vols 1–3). Author. Retrieved February 20, 2009, from, http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gl/invs1.html

Peters, G. P. & Hertwich, E. G. (2008). CO2 embodied in international trade with implications for global climate policy. Environmental Science and Technology, 42, 1401–1407.

Peters, G. P., Weber, C. L., Guan, D., & Hubacek, K. (2007). China’s growing CO2 emissions—a race between increasing consumption and efficiency gains. Environmental Science and Technology, 41, 5939–5944.

Streets, D., Yu, C., Bergin, M., Wang, X., & Carmichael, G. (2006). Modeling study of air pollution due to the manufacture of export goods in China’s Pearl River Delta. Environmental Science and Technology, 40, 2099–2107.

Weber, C., & Matthews, H. S. (2007). Embodied environmental emissions in US international trade 1997–2004. Environmental Science and Technology, 41, 4875–4881.

World Resources Institute. (2007). Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 5.0. Washington, DC: Author.